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ON COMPARING "FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENT"
AND BANKRUPTCYt
SAUL RICHARD GAMER*
The dissatisfaction in which our judicial machinery stands is such
that any process of settlement labelled popularly "out of court" or
technically "extra-legal" or "extra-judicial" has come to have a conno-
tation synonymous with, if not perfection, at least unquestioned
superiority. Because of court delays, cumbersome machinery, ques-
tionable attorney methods, incompetence of judges, and the expense
incident to judicial settlements, conciliation, arbitration and extra-
judicial settlements are assuming positions of undeniable importance
in all branches of the law. It has recently attained prominence in the
field of insolvency liquidation. Here, the characteristic phrase em-
ployed for the particular substitution for court machinery is "friendly
adjustment."
This article is intended to be an examination of some of the claims
of superiority of the "friendly adjustment" system over the bank-
ruptcy system in the matter of liquidating insolvent estates. Mr. Billig
in his recent excellent articles expounding such claims,' has defined
"friendly adjustment" as being "that type of settlement or liqui-
dation effected through the co-operation of the insolvent debtor with
his creditors."' This would, however, seem to be more of a hope and
an enthusiastic conclusion than a definition. In theory, it might equally
be applicable to that type of liquidation effected under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act.' There can be many types of "friendly adjustment."
Any settlement without court intervention may be so termed.
tThis article was prepared while engaged in the Yale School of Law
study and investigation of Bankruptcy in New Jersey, under the direction
of Professor William 0. Douglas. Acknowledgments are made to Paul 0.
Ritter, Esq., of the Pennsylvania Bar, who was also engaged. in the study,
and to George C. Levin, Esq., of the New York and Connecticut Bars, for
valuable aid and criticism. -.
*Research Assistant, 1929-193o, Yale University School of Law.
'Lauer, Conciliation- Cure For The Luw's Delay, (1928) 136 ANN. OF
THE Am. AcADEmY OF PoL. AND Soc. SCMENCE 54.
'Billig, What Price Bankrupfcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment" (1929)
L4 CORNELL LAw QUARTERLY 413; Billig, Extra Judicial Administration of In-
solvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293.
'Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at
295.
"'The present Bankruptcy Act is founded on the democratic principle of
creditors' suffrage-it is the creditors who elect the trustee to administer the
estate." 2 REmNGTON, BANKRUPTCY (1923 ed.) §1097.
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The "Friendly Adjustment" considered here is that type of extra-
legal insolvent estate settlement or liquidation which is carried out by
means of adjustment bureaus approved by and operated under a busi-
ness men's association called the National Association of Credit Men.
This method, the most outstanding of any of the extra-legal settle-
ments that fall under the head of "friendly adjustment," briefly, is as
follows: When the case is once accepted by the bureau, the liquidation
is carried out by means of an assignment for the benefit of creditors
or deed of trust, made to the bureau liquidator as trustee. The trust
deed invariably empowers the trustee to sell the assets of the estate,
and distribute the proceeds to creditors after deducting the expenses
of administration.! These expenses normally consist of approximately
a io% fee of the net assets realized. Other features of the plan will
subsequently appear as incident to the discussion.
It is proposed neither to make a "defense" of, nor an "attack" upon
either system, although, as the nature of the previous discussion has
been only to select and emphasize the defects in bankruptcy, com-
pleting the picture would almost necessarily require counteractive
treatment. It is merely intended herein to illustrate what is consid-
ered to be the inaccuracy of some of the contentions that have been
presented for each pro and con, to illustrate thenecessity of tempering
other arguments and to offer still others unmentioned. By thus pre-
senting a clearer comparison of the two systems, it is hoped to
demonstrate wherein lies the superiority of one over the other, and
what the word "superiority" in this regard should be taken to mean.
It will, of course, be impossible to consider fully all of the phases
wherein these systems are held to be respectively effective, since this
would practically require a complete diagnosis of each. The task
obviously would be stupendous. Hence, only a few of the major,
outstanding problems that already have been treated will be dis-
cussed, and with an eye only to comparisons. In general, these will
be treated in the scheme in which the problems have already been
presented by Mr. Billig: (i) The merchandising or marketing prob-
lem, namely, the methods of best reducing the assets to cash; (2)
Creditor co-operation; (3) High cost of administration and conse-
quent low returns to creditors.
"The present law goes furtherl than any Bankruptcy statute either here or
elsewhere in giving creditors the right to choose the trustees." 2 COLLIER, BANK-
R~urcy (I3th ed. 1923) ioi8.
'For a detailed descriptiorV of these bureaus and their methods of handling a
case, see Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A4 Plea for "Friendly Adjustment",
supra note 2, at 425. Also see In Defense of the Nltion s Receivables (rp27)
BuLL. NAT. Ass'N op CaRzIT lfEN.
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I. PROBLEM OF MARKETING THE ASSETS
A. Legal vs. Economic
The underlying objection to the present bankruptcy administration
of insolvent estates is that it is said to be treated as essentially a legal
and not an economic function; whereas friendly adjustment is
allegedly founded upon the hypothesis that "the disposition of an
insolvent debtor is a business and not a legal function."' The friendly
adjustment type of liquidation need adhere to no rigid outline of pro-
cedure. Sales and distribution are accomplished with regard only for
rules of business acumen. Quick sales are effected.* Creditors are
constantly kept informed while the estate is speedily liquidated. The
court and its legalities, petitions,' and lawyers are thereby eliminated,'
the liquidation being regarded as essentially a business function.
In innumerable ways are the above considerations true.' An organ-
ization with a large office force of constantly employed workers should
be able to liquidate a great number of cases efficiently and cheaply.
The work could be handled on a large scale, with business economies
that can not be taken advantage of by the "single case" bankruptcy
machinery!' Where it is possible so to do it, failure to adjust the
OBillig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for Friendly Adjustment, supra note
2, at 426.
"See Report of the Joint Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, The New York County Lawyer's Ass'n and the Bronx County Bar
Ass'n, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUmY INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF BANK-
RUPTS' ESTATES (i930) 151.
"'Legal fees are the most important single item of bankruptcy expense." Ibid. 29.
0"Administration has become not only a burden to the courts, but legalistic,
long drawn out... It has developed on the part of business men an attitude
towards the bankruptcy system of distrust and even disgust. Increasingly, in
this District, as in other sections of the country, they are turning to other
methods of liquidating insolvent estates." Ibid. 7.
"The administration of estates should be placed upon a business-like basis."
Ibid. 12.
Rosenberg, Put The Bankruptcy Business In The Hands of Experts, Forbes
Mag., April I, 1929, at x4.
"Report by the Committee on Bankruptcy Reform, THE MERCHANTS' ASS'w
OF NEW YORK, (924) 44.
Report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 84:
"The appointment of a special receiver for each bankruptcy is about as
modern a method of administering a bankrupt's estate as it would be to appoint
a special attorney for the prosecution of each crime....It is a most expensive
method of administering bankrupt estates, for, if ordinary business principles of
organization and administration were applied, the first effort at economy would
be in the direction of consolidating proceedings, reducing overhead, and de-
partmentalizing the work."
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liquidating machinery so as to gain such advantages is obviously
wasteful. Thus, this phase of the problem also suitably finds a place
under the third heading "High Cost of Administration", and the dis-
cussion here presented should also there be considered equally ap-
plicable.
The "business" technique, however, is one that is more than likely
not to lend itself to the conditions and problems actually encountered.
This is so because there are a vast number of considerations other
than that of an efficient business mill turning out hundreds of cases.
As a broad statement, it is difficult to understand how the adminis-
tration of any technical, statutory enactment involves solely "busi-
ness" rather than "legal" methods, if a distinction must be made be-
tween the two." Few, it would seem, in this present day would dis-
pute either the actual business necessity of a national bankruptcy act
of some sort. The National Association of Credit Men itself was
far-sighted enough to be among the original advocates of a bankruptcy
statute." Where any statutory enactment is involved, it would appear
"Might it not seem that "business" and "law" are so intimately bound to-
gether in this connection that it is extremely difficult to draw a line between the
two? The so-called "legalistic" theory, calling for petitions to the court by the
receiver and trustee to do such acts as "selling real estate at auction, redeeming
property from a lien, selling property subject to a lien, or selling perishable
property." (Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra
note 2, at 27) is mainly for the purpose of allowing creditors to be heard so
that they may handle these matters according to their own business-like judg-
ment and methods.
The statement has also been made that "the services of these lawyers cannot
be dispensed with under the prevailing system." Billig, What Price Bank-
ruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra note 2, at 42o. This is not
wholly accurate. In the Yale School of Law Study of Bankruptcy cases in the
District of New Jersey, it was found that out of ioo cases picked at random,
in 1o the trustee hadj no attorney, in 4 the receiver had no attorney, and in 3,
neither had attorneys. This was probably aided by the fact that such receivers
or trustees were attorneys themselves. In like manner, it has been suggested
that the "official receiver" should preferably consist of a lawyer and legal staff,
because of the legal services and knowledge required at every turn of the receiv-
er's routine duties. See Report, THE MEaCHAN s' Ass'N OF NEv YORK, supra
note io, at 46.
In New York City, however, "an examination which we made of 854 cases
prior to the appointment of the Irving Trust Co. disclosed that in every one of
them, there was an attorney for the receiver". Report, IN THE MATTER OF AN
IxQUIRY, ETc., spra note 7, at io8. At present, however, the Irving Trust Co.
does not employ attorneys in every case.
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2,
at 317.
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to be axiomatic that the lawyer's presence is not superfluous, if not
absolutely necessary. Words must be interpreted, "legislative intent"
must be determined, a body of precedents develop that must be known
or be able to be discovered,--the innumerable situations calling for the
laywer's and the court's services where any statute is involved are too
obvious to require further elaboration."
But especially in the administration of a statute such as the Bank-
ruptcy Act something in the nature of a "legal" technique would seem
peculiarly useful. The collapse of a business structure or of an indi-
vidual's affairs invariably leaves a tangle with which the lawyer can
best cope. There is very often more than the simple matter of mar-
shalling the assets, selling them and distributing the proceeds to credi-
tors. After first solving the often difficult problem of what com-
prises the estate,1' encumbrances which must be removed offer legal
stumbling blocks. Discovering the number of liens, mortgages, con-
ditional sale agreements, and examining their effect and validity often
present bewildering situations. A "business man" would naturally
be lost in the maze of entanglements commonly encountered in the
administration of this particular type of estate.' In the further prob-
lem of the fraudulent failure, it would seem that the law with its
definitions, and the lawyer with his knowledge and interpretations
of the law are both necessary. And as would be expected, friendly
adjustment by admission is neither capable nor desirous of handling
a so-called "fraudulent" failure." In support of the contention that only
a negligible number of bankruptcies falls into this category, the aver-
age failure being one of mere business inefficiency,.' Bradstreet's
figures as to the causes of business failures are offered in evidence,'
and the common, inherent feeling is invoked that most men, including
MSee report, IN THE MATE OF AN INQUIRY, .rc., sup!ra note 7, at 12, 25.
"Bonbright and Pickett, Valuatlion to Determine Solvency Under The Bank-
ruptcy Act, (1929) 20 CoL. L. REv. 582, 596.
"The situation would appear somewhat comparable to that encountered in
the administration of decedents' estates with its attendant collapse of affairs, in
which statutory enactments, and therefore court administration and lawyers'
services are necessary.
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at
296.
17Ibid. 297; Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment",
supra note 2, at 417.
"sBillig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at
297, n. io; Billig, WhaP Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adist-
inent", supra note 2, at 417, n. 22 (a).
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business men, are honest. But such an analysis of the causes of fail-
ures," placing as it does in definite, cut-and-dried categories every
failure, attributing to each, one specific "cause", like pegs fitting
exactly into holes, cannot be accepted as of significant value. The
complicated causes for business failures cannot be so reduced to
pigeon-holed conclusions, for the factors entering into any given
case are innumerable. The Yale School of Law investigation finds
them social, medical, psychological and economic.' Furthermore, the
mere cursory reading of the records of a large number of closed bank-
ruptcy cases leaves one with the firm conviction thataffirmative "fraud"
as a cause enters into many more cases than have been so classified.'
And still further investigation discloses that even thoughthemajor, out-
standing "cause" of large numbers of cases cannot be attributed to
the one word "fraud", nevertheless situations approaching the "il-
legal" and "fraudulent" crop up everywhere in such cases. A bank-
rupt who has been rendered such by reason of a motor vehicle acci-
"The Bradstreet report on causes of business failures in the United States
during 1928 states that, out of 20,373 such failures, 6396 were caused by the in-
competence of the insolvent; 72,9o resulted from his lack of capital; and such
specific conditions as disaster, war and floods were responsible for 3613 others.
Only 544 of the failures reported were caused by fraudulent conduct on the
part of the insolvent The remainder were brought about by inexperience, un-
wise credits, neglect of business affairs and competition." Billig, Extra-Judicial
Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at 297.
"The typical "cause" of many failures would have to be explained in terms
similar to these: "...a combination of rent too high for the volume of business
reasonably handled by a business man of the particular type studied with an
unusual amount of family illness, the condition being aggravated by a lack of
caution on the part of certain large creditors in extending credit. The whole
combination of circumstances, however, led to an easily avertable insolvency if
the debtor had not finally become involved with 'loan shark' agencies."
See Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem
in Methodology (930) 39 YALE L. J. 1013.
'This mainly because of the large numbers of no-asset cases which slip by
with no or inadequate investigations, so that the causes of these failures are
never made clear, though many show almost ummistakable signs of fraud.
Creditors are unwilling to go to the expense of conducting private investigations
which they feel they should not bear, or which would be exceedingly difficult to
prove, thereby involving larger losses than already suffered.
The author examined over i,ooo cases closed during the fiscal year 1928-1929
in New Jersey.
Also, see Wisehart, Have You The Right To Be In Business?, Am. Mag.,
Aug. i93o, at 27, quoting Federal Judge Clark of the New Jersey District.... "a
large majority of those who are benefiting by the Bankruptcy Act are incom-
petent or unethical business experimenters."
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dent and a resulting judgment for negligence may attempt to conceal
assets. Another whose plight was caused by large medical bills re-
sulting from unprecedented illness may attempt to "take care" of a
few of his friends, relatives, and friendly creditors before filing his
petition. The situations are innumerable. In other words, fraud may
play an important part in bankruptcies not set in motion with fraudu-
lent intent. When the rigorous procedure of the Bankruptcy Act
does not seem completely capable of coping with these situations there
should at least be hesitancy in discarding whatever protection it might
be able to furnish.
The friendly adjustment scheme must therefore be prepared to
deal with the fraudulent cases if it seeks to cover the ground ade-
quately. Even if it refuses to deal with them it must face the prob-
lem "what is fraud?", i.e., by what rule of thumb is friendly adjust-
ment to decide whether or not to accept the case. The formula offered
is that when upon general examination, the debtor appears to be
honest, willing to cooperate with his creditors, and to lay his tra-
ditional cards upon the proverbial table,' it is a case for friendly ad-
justment. Even assuming for the sake of the discussion that the dif-
ferences between fraud and inefficiency are more than ethereal' (and
to the average creditor who has shipped goods for which he has re-
ceived no return payment, this difference is more apparent than real),'
the test offered would still appear unsatisfactory. Who can at-
tempt to say what is "honesty" or "fraud" in vacuo. Might not one
creditor's conception be entirely different from that of another? Might
not the bureau's standard be still another, considering the psycho-
logical, subconscious effect of the fee of at least io% ?' Does it
not seem that the problem of "what is fraud?" in this connection can
pursue only philosophical, speculative paths and reach inevitably the
only concrete answer we have, i.e., the product of human experience
as exemplified in "the law"; that friendly adjustment, in its search of
what is an "honest" bankrupt, should find itself forced to resort to the
2Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", mtpra
note 2, at 430.
uCompare in tort law the disappearing distinctions for liability between negli-
gent cr affirmative misconduct, and "accidental" injuries.
21Likewise, in tort law, the person who is injured accidentally rather than
intentionally or negligently.
2'In Mr. Billig's excellent charts setting forth the results of certain cases
liquidated by bureaus during 1926-1927, the average cost of administration ap-
pears to be 13.85% of the amounts realized. See Billig, What Price Bankruptcy:-
.4 Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra note 2, at 432, 433.
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law's dictation of what shall or shall not be considered as "honest"
dealings? In this instance, it can be found only in the Bankruptcy
Act.
So far fraud and dishonesty have only been mentioned in relation
to the bankrupt. But the Bankruptcy Act also provides creditors
with protection against each other. The importance of such protection
cannot be over-emphasized, yet there seems little in the friendly ad-
justment scheme to furnish it. Three sections of the Bankruptcy Act
safeguard the rights of creditors inter se: Section 6o allows suit for
the recovery of preferences to creditors within four months of the
filing of the petition, and Sections 67 and 70 provide for the recovery
by the trustee of fraudulent transfers in which creditors have partici-
pated. And in certain situations, especially where corporations are
involved, it may be considered essential, either by state statute or
case law,' to refuse to countenance certain conduct upon the part of
the creditor, though it be innocent and devoid of preferential intent.'
In the interests of public policy, the frame of mind or conduct of the
debtor, then, should not be the sole criterion as to the bureau's ac-
ceptance of a case. The raison d'etre of the Bankruptcy Act, it must
also be remembered, is equality of distribution to creditors.'
The administration of any statute requires in innumerable ways
the court and the lawyer. A bankruptcy act. in particular, with its
entangling problems, peculiarly necessitates the lawyer's services,
and the problem of fraud and other allied considerations to wbich
the nature of this subject especially finds itself susceptible, can best be
solved by the law and the lawyer. These reasons indicate that one
should be wary of wholly subscribing to the fundamental hypothesis
of friendly adjustment, that "the disposition of insolvent estates is
essentially a business, not a legal function."
B. Realization of Assets
The bankruptcy machinery is said to be unsatisfactory in reducing
the debtor's assets to cash because of the frequent employment as
IN. Y. CONS. LAws, c. 59 (STocK Coni. LAW) §15. Under the Stock Cor-
poration Law, a transfer may be declared void although the creditor had no
reasonable cause to believe that any preference was being effected. (Amend-
ment to the Law effective April 15th, 1929. N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 59 (Cum.
Supp. 1930) §15.) Section 67 e of the Act is so construed as to give effect to
local state law.
v'Woods v. Metropolitan Nat Bank, 126 Wash. 346, 218 Pact 266 (1923),
Which accomplishes the same result by means of the "trust fund" theory of cor-
porate assets. 2(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 788.
ISee I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (I 3 th ed. 1923) 6.
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receiver or trustee of a lawyer who is unskilled in business or mer-
chandising.' In this important operation, the "business man" hypo-
thesis does seem to have especial significance. Obviously, business
men as a class can buy and sell merchandise better than attorneys as
a class. Familiarity with bankruptcy practice, however, discloses the
fact that the same men recur as bankruptcy officials so frequently
that ample opportunity is presented them to become expert in mer-
chandising. In some measure, also, these frequent appointments af-
ford the bankruptcy machinery some of the advantages of the large
scale methods above discussed.
Furthermore, although the picture of a permanent organization is
not associated with bankruptcy,--to which have been applied the
terms of "single case receiver" and "single case trustee",--the re-
peatedly appointed receiver or trustee may also have his regularly
employed helpers. If they do not take the form of a "staff", neverthe-
less, skill obviously may be attained as a result of repeated operations.
That lawyers receive these recurring appointments would appear to
favor the susceptibility to becoming skilled. Lawyers are not at the low-
est plane of intelligence.' Of course, not all officials fall into this re-
peatedly appointed, and therefore experienced class. Thousands are
appointed once, or only rarely. These are usually ignorant of the nec-
essary operations and the quality of their work is poor. It cannot
t'Billig, Extra-Jndicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, "Ipra note 2,
at 298; Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment",
supra note 2, at 417.
'Joseph B. Jacobs, a Boston attorney, wrote us:
"Some of the worst fizzles in receiverships, both in equity and bankruptcy
in this jurisdiction, have been the administration of business men as receivers."
Referee B. Loring Young of Boston, testified to the same effect. Report, IN
THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 85.
"Business men apparently cannot generally be induced to serve, and where
they have served, the experiment has generally proved unsatisfactory. Attorneys
receive the bulk of appointments everywhere." Ibid. io6.
'See report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQuiRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 17. Over half
of the appointments in New York City from July, 1927 to January, 1929, were
made in favor of those who received only one appointment "Most of those
appointed either had no training in liquidation work or were designated in so
few cases that they never became really familiar with their more important
duties. With but few exceptions they had neither the time nor the skill which
the work required."
It should be remembered, however, that it is the attorney for the receiver and
trustee that has generally come to the important liquidating officer. The former
New York City condition was such that "The bulk of the Bankruptcy practice
... was concentrated in the hands of approximately 21 law firms." Ibid 4, In the
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
be claimed that the Bankruptcy situation is as satisfactory as that
which would accrue from a large and steadily employed organization.'
The actual, present conditions in bankruptcy, however, are not com-
pletely alien to the proposed situation.
The repeated appointment of the same persons to the positions of
receiver and trustee, while it may result in the acquisition of market-
ing skill, has been declared to be a weakness and the system which
leads to the odious "ring". Some consideration must now be given to
this objection to the bankruptcy system. The word "ring" is em-
ployed in two ways. First, it applies to the group which secures for
itself the offices and fees in the case. By favoritism with judges and
referees, by solicitation of claims, by filing an involuntary petition or
a petition for the appointment of a receiver, either of which invari-
ably leads to the positions of attorney for the receiver and trustee,"
control of the case is secured. Second, it also may apply to that group
of auctioneers and henchman-buyers and bidders who stifle competi-
tion. These "rings" may intertwine or be identical. The latter is
the more important in a consideration of the marketing problem.
The cry of "ring", fraud and dishonesty as a reason for avoiding
bankruptcy-and invoking friendly adjustment has frequently sounded.'
It is a charge at times rightly made and with which bankruptcy has of-
ten been embarrassed. As a basis for the preference of friendly adjust-
ment it is, of course, a just one. Where one system is administered by
honest men, and a rival system by rogues and the dregs of a profes-
sion, no business man should patronize the latter.Y But if the bank-
Yale New Jersey study, although complete analysis had as yet not been
made, it was obvious that the great bulk of cases are liquidated by the same
persons, who appear intermittently as receivers, trustees, or attorneys for the
receiver or trustee.
'See report, THE MERCHANTS' Ass'N OF Nz.v YORK, suipra note io, at 36.
'Certain districts, New York included, have enacted a rule prohibiting the ap-
pointment of attorneys representing petitioning creditors or creditors petitioning
for the appointment of a receiver from acting either as attorney for the receiver
or trustee, unless specially authorized by the court In New Jersey, however,
out of 5o cases picked at randoni, in which there were these various offices, 49
showed the same attorneys for the receiver and trustee as appeared either for
the petitioning creditors or petitioned for a receiver.
'Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 413, 414, 415, 418, 422, 423, 424, 425, 427, 444, 445; Billig, Ex~tra-
Judicial Administration of Inslovent Estates, supra note 2, at 293, 294, 295,
300, 318, 319.
-Pope's oft-quoted lines from his Essay on Man should probably here be kept
in mind:
"For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administered is best :"
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ruptcy system is, in certain localities saturated with dishonest practi-
tioners who are the shame of the Bar this is not necessarily to be
taken as such "evidence of flaws in the system itself",' as to make it
unquestionably worthy only of being discarded. It may or it may not
be. It is primarily with such systematic faults and their alleged cor-
rection in friendly adjustment with which we can here be concerned.
Considering the repeated appointments to be evidence of a "ring",
or asserting that the possibility of such "ring" formation is an inher-
ent weakness in the system, may not always be just. It may be evi-
dence of many other conditions--of an enlightened referee who
wishes to have a trained group of men administer, the cases assigned
to him; of honest judges or referees who insist upon having them-
selves surrounded by men whom they feel they can trust and who are
also honest; of the appointment of attorneys who know most about
the case and who therefore are in position to give the most valuable
and intelligent service._" To discard the bankruptcy system in favor
of friendly adjustment for this reason is a ridiculous indictment of
human nature, the Bench and the Bar.'
If there are rings in some localities there are other localities,
where thousands upon thousands of bankruptcy cases are adminis-
tered honestly.
Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment," supra
note 2, at 415.
"The all-important fact is that the system was such as not only to facili-
tate, but to invite both inefficiency and corruption." Report, IN THE MATTER
OF AN INQUIRY arc., supra note 7, at 6.
"The administration cannot be improved except by a fundamental change in
the statute itself." Ibid. I3.
But see Coles, The Doitovan Report, etc., (1930) i6 A. B. A. J. 431, in
which Col. Donovan's failure to distinguish between faults of the law and faults
of administration is commented upon.
The Committee in the report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., supra
note 7, at 34, recommends that "the rules concerning the retention of the same
creditor's attorney or any attorney for the receiver or tristee be left to local
regulation".
"See testimony of Referee Joseph B. Cheshire, Jr. of Raleigh; N. C. "which
is typical of many others received from the smaller districts," Ibid. 204 "In this
part of the country, we do not have a great many problems that confront the
referees in the large cities of the East or Middle West. Our population is
stable and native and we know everyone. I am personally acquainted, and have
been for years, with 75%, or more, of the lawyers who practice in bankruptcy
matters.... I also know a great many of the trustees personally and know all
about them. I can usually get very high class trustees to accept cases, as a
matter of public duty, where the compensation is totally inadequate for the
work involved."
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Also, as has been often pointed out, both the conditions of unskill-
fulness (which is more closely connected with the marketing prob-
lem) and dishonesty can largely be cured under the present Act by
the repeated appointment as receiver of a large, reputable trust or-
ganization, the practice now adopted in the Southern District of New
York. This is one of the recommendations made for bankruptcy by
Mr. Billig,' but as it can be effected without an amendment to the
Act, it is a suggestion that is not necessarily concerned with "evidence
of flaws in the system itself". Whether or not the g~neral idea is to be
attributed to, or is to be taken as a lesson to be learned from friendly
adjustment, it has the indorsement of many of those familiar with
the situation"
It is still difficult, however, to understand how any given method
would entirely do away with the possibility of the "ring", as it is
alleged friendly adjustment would accomplish. Honesty is not a quality
that is peculiar to corporations or associations. Both friendly adjust-
ment and bankruptcy, as is the case with any system, must work
through individuals, who in turn must exercise discretion, make de-
cisions, etc." Of course, reputation for honesty is practically the sole
assurance against "ring" work in any given case," as it is in any
other phase of law or business, and risks of dishonest favoritism in
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, mupra note 2,
at 318.
"'In the report, THE MERCHANTS' Ass'N. OF NEW Y oRx, supra note 10,
judge Learned Hand, Judge Knox, and Judge Manton among many attorneys
and business men testified in favor of "Official Receivers" which is also the
device employed in the English Act.
See also the report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQuiRY, Enrc., supra note 7, at 20,
xi6-i2I, endorsing the Irving Trust Co. idea
In this connection, it is interesting to note that one of the largest and most
influential of the Friendly Adjustment bureaus is vigorously opposed to the
recently adopted experiment in the Southern District of New York.
A minority of the Committee submitting the report, THE MERCHANTS' Ass'N.
OF NEW Yo.:K, supra note io, dissented in part from the recommendations con-
cerning official receivers.
"See Casey, Corporate Administration Of The Bankruptcy Law (193o) 15
Comm. LAw LEAGUE 292.
""It (the scheme of Official Receivers) would work provided the pooling...
would be sufficient to maintain a corps of really competent assistants. It is not
the eight or ten people whom you make your Official Receivers; it is the char-
acter-of the staff you have....They have to be paid, and be paid decently; it
is purely a question of finance." Testimony of Miss Bertha Rembaugh in the
report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Reform, MERCHANTS' Ass'N. OF NEW
YORK, supra note io, at 46.
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appointments might be considerably lessened if such a commonly
reputed, "honest" entity were repeatedly appointed. An individual,
however, could also easily fulfill these requirements, but there is diffi-
culty in finding individuals who would be willing to spend the required
time on such comparatively unremunerative work. A wealthy cor-
poration, however, might be willing to fill the role.' But it should be
pointed out that though the use in bankruptcy of a large reputable
corporation even satisfies some of the friendly adjustment critics, it
would not ipso facto eliminate the "ring" a possibility to which any
system is susceptible.
The "ring", then, it would seem, is a question of human frailty
rather than of weakness in the system adopted, and it is not peculiar
to bankruptcy. Equally as vicious "rings" may crop up as a product
of the friendly adjustment system, nor is there any guarantee that its
increased power and growth will not furnish similar problems with
those of the bankruptcy named. The devices by which dishonesties
may be veiled in a long standing system as bankruptcy are obviously
greater than in the comparatively recent friendly adjustment system.
'If one system eliminates dishonesty and another is saturated with it,
examination discloses that there is little that is inherently systematic
to account for the difference, unless it be the elimination of lawyers.
The officials of both are bonded. Both systems function upon a fee
basis. Any allegations of difference appear to be mere platitudes."
The solution for this whole problem of marketing assets, if there is
any solution, would rather seem to be a complete discarding of the
'The Irving Trust Co. in New York does not consider their venture to be of
great financial potentiality. It was described to the author as "a social experi-
ment". See the memorandum filed in the report, IN THE MATTER OF AN IN-
Qrmy, ETc., supra note 7, at io: "Stautory fees allowed in the small estates
are so far exceeded by the cost of administration that the Trust Company has
thus far found the business as a whole unprofitable, and may be constrained to
abandon it. Up to July ist, 1929, the average fees of the Trust Co. per case
were $198.59, the average cost per case $4o7.o3, and the average loss per case
was $2o8.44-"
""The approved Adjustment Bureaus are under intelligent, skillful, aggres-
sive, well-trained and well supervised management. The honesty and integrity
of every member of their personnel is beyond question. In order to secure the
approval of the National Association of 'Credit Men, Adjustment Bureaus are
required to comply with strict regulations covering organization, management.
personnel, machinery, policies, protection of client's interests, care of corre-
spondence, finances, records, and supervision by local boards of directors and by
the National Association of 'Credit Men". In Defense of the Nation's Receiv-
ables, mepra note 5, at 9.
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present fee system for one of officialdom. Well paid governmental
officers, receiving a regular salary bearing no relation to the business
handled are suggested."' Competent and untemptable men would sup-
posedly then be assured. But friendly adjustment, it should be remem-
bered, also functions upon a fee basis. And because it is in the nature
of a business, since it must have cases to be able to support its organiza-
tion, it would seem open to the similar dangers of solicitation preva-
lent in the bankruptcy system.' In fact, investigation into the affairs
of the bureaus in certain large cities (Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh)
discloses that during some period of their existence a change in person-
nel has resulted from conditions which have been interpreted to re-
semble partially the "ring" situation in bankruptcy. ' Bureau officials
are not magnanimously overpaid. They are but human beings, subject
to the same temptations and weaknesses of others. And, in the infor-
mality of the system, there is no intricate, elaborate procedure of checks
and accountability such as the Bankruptcy Law provides. Nor is there
any opportunity for public scrutiny. Bankruptcy defects in this re-
gard, are unremedied in friendly adjustment which itself bristles with
possibilities that are little short of startling. So much then for the
question of repeated appointments, and the considerations of skillful
merchandising, competent staffs, and "rings" to which it leads.
Considering now the actual mechanics by which the cash is realized,
a major objection to the marketing system employed in bankruptcy is
that it requires the use of the 'ublic auction sale, which, with its "re-
sulting low returns", is forced upon the trustee. The low returns are
caused by the expense of such a sale, and the inadequacy of the bids
due to its "forced" character. Yet another objection is that the
trustee's sale in bankruptcy is held only after such a period of time
that the item "rent for administration expenses" consumes practically
all of the proceeds derived from the sale, whereas the flexibility of
the friendly adjustment system permits almost immediate reduction
"See report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 43, also
at 85, 88, where out-and-out official administration is considered. Partial offi-
cialdom is recommended. But see Coles, op. cit. supra note 37, at 435.
""The Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association in its 1924
report cited as a major evil the establishment of bureaus for liquidation work,
the maintenance of which depends upon 'the earning of fees resulting from
methods which are not only parallel with but encourage the practices of those
attorneys whose activities are condemned'." Report, IN THE MATTER OF AN
INQUIRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 177.
"See infra note 72.
'See infra note io8.
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to cash. The problem can best be considered in two parts: (i) the
time element involved, and (2) the prices obtained.
As to time, friendly adjustment undoubtedly has much the advan-
tage. In this it presents its greatest appeal. Where no receiver is
appointed, the sale cannot be held in bankruptcy until a trustee is
elected or appointed. During the interval, rent mounts, insurance
premiums accrue, watchmen's expenses may be necessary, and the
goods may deteriorate, or the season for their best marketability may
pass. Friendly adjustment, however, can theoretically reduce the
assets to cash the day after it receives the case. The importance of
this item cannot be over-estimated. However, where there is a re-
ceiver appointed in bankruptcy, the difference in powers would not
seem great, for such receivership appointments are very often made
upon the same day the petition is filed, or upon one immediately fol-
lowing." A prompt receiver's sale, of course, reduces the above ex-
pense items." And in districts like New York in which the prerequisite
of "absolutely necessary" for the appointment of a receiver is so
'The following represents the lapse of time in days between the filing of the
petition and the appointment of the receiver in ioo cases picked at random in
The Yale New Jersey study:














"'With a few exceptions, in the larger urban centers, and in many of the
smaller ones throughout the country, the necessity of going forward promptly
with administration in asset cases is recognized, and receiverships, as well as
receivers sales, are common." Report,. IN THE MATm OF AN INgQUIRY, Erc.,
supra note 7, at 106.
"...the average length of time elapsing between the sale and the petition in
bankruptcy was approximately 34 days in the involuntary and 23 days in volun-
tary cases ( for New York City). In Bankruptcy cases studied by Mr. Billig
and Mr. Ritter in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, and St Paul, the average be-
tween the date of petition and sale was 51 days." Ibid. I96.
The results in the Yale New Jersey study indicate little activity upon the
part of receivers, in spite of their prompt appointment, to capitalize upon their
powers to effect quick sales. Out of 82 cases picked at random, the average
between the petition and sale dates was 40.5 days.
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liberally construed that a receiver is appointed at least in every asset
case, the time consumed in reducing the assets to cash should be little
more than in friendly adjustment, with the single reservation of the
involuntary case in which the adjudication is contested and no consent
to sell can be secured.'
It is to be noted also, for the purpose of speeding up the reduction
to cash process, the use of the privatet sale is not outside the powers
of bankruptcy." It has been intimated that the private sale is only a
"theoretical" possibility.' But investigation shows it to be a device
that often is employed,' and the method is frequently used for the
sole purpose of a quicker sale.
In the matter of advantageous prices there seems to be no inherent
reason why receivers and trustees in bankruptcy cannot invoke the
same means of producing buyers as can the bureau liquidator.
Investigation discloses that this is the case.' Knowledge as to who are
the persons and agencies interested in buying the various kinds of
stocks is not limited to the friendly adjustment liquidator. The oft-
appointed bankruptcy official also possesses such common, or easily
acquired knowledge. The public auction method also has been charged
to be a source of difficulty. But friendly adjustment itself is com-
mitted to the public auction method.' And the private sale is also
used in bankruptcy.
5"The statement has been made that "the very fact that creditors have six
months from the date of the adjudication in which to file their claims [in bank-
ruptcy] makes the period of liquidation normally a long one, and the item of
administration rent is bound to be correspondingly high." Billig, Extra-Judcial
Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at 3og. This, of course,
is not true. The late filing of proofs of claim has no relation to a quick sale of
assets for the purpose of leaving the place of business, thereby reducing the
rent and other items involved.
Also, the Bulk Sales Acts of the various states, often calling for notices, exten-
sions of time, etc., must frequently be considered in friendly adjustment. See ex-
ample cited in Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra
note 2, at 316.
'General Order XVIII authorizes the use of the private sale.
t*Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 418.
'In the Yale study, out of ioo cases in which there were sales (picked at
random from the New Jersey cases), private sales were effected in 34.
"In Chicago, the professional receivers keep files of all buyers they have done
business with or know of, and also use the classified section of the telephone
directory. To these are sent notices of the stock being offered. The sales de-
partment of the Irving Trust Co. is also a highly organized unit.
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Adiinistration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at
299.
"FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENT" AND BANKRUPTCY 51
So far as the "forced" character of the sale is concerned, both
systems, it would seem, are on a par. Generally, all sales of insolvent
estates are "forced". The goods must be disposed of. Buyers know
this, and will not feel impelled to offer more for stocks of insolvent
estates, whether sold through the bankruptcy or the friendly adjust-
ment system. Furthermore, if the assets are to be sold immediately,
as friendly adjustment prides itself in being able to accomplish,-and
which would be necessary at any rate for a reduction of the rent
item,--the sale would appear to be all the more "forced", since time
cannot be consumed in a prolonged search foil the highest bidder. In
other words, the quicker the sale the more "forced" it might be.'
At this point in either system we encounter the second type of
"ring" above referred to, that is, the auctioneer and his co-workers
who conspire to force the sale of such insolvent estate stocks at unfair
and practically "fixed" prices. This phase of the "ring" problem is
not a matter of systems. Prospective bidders at the friendly adjust-
ment sale may collude to stifle bids, and obviously little can be done
about it. Friendly adjustment, however, is described as employing
the following method of insuring an "honest auction". "[T] he bureau
auctioneer is instructed first to take bulk bids on certain lots of
stock, and later to take piecemeal bids on the same lots from various
buyers. If the bulk bid for a certain group of items totals more thata
the piecemeal bids for the same group, the bulk bid will prevail, and
vice versa."' But this identical type of public auction is commonly
held under the Bankruptcy Act,' concerning which charges of fraud
and dishonesty have been made. This method of sale will not pro-
hibit a "ring" from its activities. It can control both piece-lot and
bulk bids. Auctioneers have been charged to "knock-down" piece-lot
bids at low figures, so that the later bulk bid will far exceed the
piece-lot bids (or vice versa) and by comparison seem a fair and
honest offer, whereas in reality it is also a low, controlled price. In
From a study made by the U. S. Department of Commerce of 25 cases closed
in friendly adjustment by the Newark, N. J. Bureau, representing the bulk of
such work done by the Bureau in the past two years, those cases in which
records of sales could be secured showed 7 private sales and 4 by public auction.
'OBonbright and Pickett, op. cit. supra note 14, at 598.
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note, 2.
at 311.
'Out of 8o public auction cases in the Yale New Jersey study, picked at ran-
dom, this method was employed in 72.
The method is commonly required by district rules. See Bankruptcy Rule 8,
E. Dist. of N. Y.; Bankruptcy Rule 8, So. Dist. N. Y. New Jersey has no
such rule.
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bankruptcy, at least, there is the further check of the appraisal of the
bankrupt's estate by the three appraisers required by Section 7ob
of the Act.'
Still another feature in which friendly adjustment claims to excel
bankruptcy in the realization of assets is in the manner of the col-
lection of outstanding accounts receivable. Any success whatsoever
in this regard is sufficient to warrant a claim of superiority.' While
the claim seems to fail of substantial proof,' it would appear that a
system giving over a part of its organization to the handling of such
accounts, as does friendly adjustment, should undoubtedly give more
'Of course a capable "ring" would also control the appraisers.
"The following is a tabulation of the results of collection of accounts re-
ceivable in ioo cases picked at random in the New Jersey study:
Amt.Sched. Amt.Realized Anzt.Sched. Amt.Realized Aint.Sched. Amt.Realized
1. 13.50 0 35. 2000.00 o 69. 3264.o6 o
2. 373.99 0 36. 1346.94 306.24 70. 25.00 0
3. 2200.00 0 37. 121.00 0 71. 233.30 ioo.86
4. 7720.21 3.58 38. 143.63 0 72. 229.97 0
5.' 12655.13 0 39- 53-45 0 73. 4001.98 0
6. 1675.52 0 40. 40.00 o 74. 166.66 o
7. 7500.00 0 41. 707.09 90.46 75. 15.75 0
8. 138.38 0 42. 5939.78 3000.00 76. 18.69 o
9. 2367.43 1832.97 43. 71.93 0 77. 6oo.oo 0
IO. 6247 15.46 44. IIIO.50 0 78. 4059.40 0
JI. 246.00 0 45. 1945.00 100.00 79. 40.00 0
I2_. 2573.80 0 46. 12975.0i 0 80. 1353493 0
13. 292.6o 0 47. 217.37 0 81. 200.00 0
14. 1000.00 33487 48. 113.70 o 82. 7.50 0
15. 2516.30 20.00 49. 2247.63 186.67 83. 215.37 0
16. 2632.50 0 50. 51317.66 o 84. 8771.12 0
17. 135-45 8.00 51. 400-00 o 85. 18.25 0
i8. 18300.03 15o26.45 52. 3420.00 o 86. 241.05 0
19. 1400.00 11.25 53. 221.00 15.00 87. 32.90 0
20. 122.90 0 54. 6125.45 3715.94 88. 1382.61 51.32
21. 364.75 0 55. 49.20 0 89. 1298.00 0
22. 140.63 25.00 56. 88.oo 0 90. 3344-00 0
23. 40.00 o 57. 658.06 60470 91. 104.95 15.00
24. 10.00 0 58. 1122.79 o 92. 2168.5o 0
25. 543.68 0 59. 151.14 24.89 93. '684.oo 0
26. 4133.84 118.85 60. 5000.00 14.87 94. 795.91 0
27. 1285.99 5.00 61. 2260.00 0 95. 949.49 0
28. 2378.19 o 62. 88.40 o 96. 300.00 0
29. 700.00 0 63. 150.00 0 97. 2903.49 337.49
30. 14346.81 303.60 64. 3.00 o 98. 27oo.oo 0
31. 6447.76 79.8 65. 1400.00 6o.2o 99. 510.52 0
32. 0 i.oo 66. 1963.8o 2226.84 100. 909.40 415.00
33. 223.67 o 67. 86.95 0
34 10409.00 0 68. 165.oo 0
"See Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Isolvent Estates, supra note 2,
at 299,n. 14,in which but three cases are cited as follows: i.of $16,432.18, $15,9o2.48
was collected; 2. of $22,842.85, $16,661.44 was collected; 3. of $36,o41.o2, $26,-
298.06 was collected. Similar cases showing success in this matter may also be
selected from the bankruptcy court records.
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satisfactory results. Yet on the other hand organized collection agen-
cies such as those of friendly adjustment not only may be, but actually
are set up under the Bankruptcy Act.' It should also be remembered
that, in bankruptcy, invariably either the lawyer-receiver, or the law-
yer-trustee, or the receiver's or trustee's attorney will handle such col-
lections. When the average business man wishes to place the collection
of an account into reliable hands, the matter is very often entrusted
to an attorney. Bankruptcy, in effect, ipso facto does this for the
creditor.
Collecting the accounts receivable of any insolvent or financially
embarrassed estate has baffled the best minds, whatever the method.
When a business is being liquidated, whether it be by means of equity
receivership, bankruptcy, official bureau of friendly adjustments, or
un-official creditor trust-deed arrangements, the psychology of the
one indebted to the insolvent's estate is the same. It is a well known
psychology that reduces such accounts to practical worthlessness. It
is comparable to the "forced" character of the sale of the insolvent's
goods. Again, by the time the estate finds its way into the liquidating
system's hands, be it bankruptcy or friendly adjustment, the debts
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are often old ones, which the insolvent himself has already long tried to
collect. Their uncollectibility is often a primary cause of the failure.
Rarely does a going concern collapse suddenly. Its death is invariably
preceded by a long, drawn-out illness, a period during which all
available resources have been continuously summoned to stave off the
impending disaster. So that the cause of the accounts being uncollect-
ible ist essentially not the fact that the estate is being liquidated by a
poor system, but rather is to be found buried in events of months
long standing. In other words, the debt comes to bankruptcy-or
friendly adjustment-a bad one. Debtors move. They have unknown
addresses. They become financially irresponsible and judgment proof.
They disclaim liability. It seems impossible that friendly adjustment
can often change the actual course of human events. If anything,
bankruptcy, as a system, would seem to be in an advantageous posi-
tion because of the powers granted under 2IA of the Act which
would allow the subpoenaing of debtors.
In one important phase of the collection problem is the friendly
adjustment system inherently at a distinct advantage, however. Bank-
ruptcy liquidation is effected publicly. Much of the debtor's psychol-
ogy above referred to would not be a troublesome factor if he did
not know of his creditor's financial embarrassment. But friendly
adjustment works quietly. It is not an official system and need have
no publicity. If tfie business remains open under a receiver in bank-
ruptcy, however, this difficulty is partially over-come.' No remedy for
this phase of the problem, of course, is possible. In fact, if the
friendly adjustment system were given legal recognition, as has been
advocated, its advantage in this particular would be dispelled.-
II. CREDITOR NoN-COOPERATION
The observance has often been made that creditors do not cooper-
ate in the ordinary, bankruptcy case, and, of course, this is too com-
"Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 419.
This fact is commonly recognized, and a frequent New Jersey allegation for
the appointment of a receiver is "Petitioner further shows that he has informa-
tion that the bankrupt has outstanding accounts which demand attention; that
if the debtors become advised of the bankruptcy herein they will delay making
payments through various pretexts and excuses, and some will move and the
accounts become lost.. ."
See Case No. 18, supra note 62, in which this was the situation.
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monly known to dispute.' Claims are assigned. Little regard is
'The following represents results, in 75 asset cases picked at random in the
Yale New Jersey study, of creditors recorded as attending in person the meet-
















































































































56 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
given to the election of a trustee.' The entire matter of lack of
creditor interest is declared to be a wide open door for the entry
of fraud. The bkeakdown of the theory of creditor control upon which
the Bankruptcy Act is based has conclusively been proved.' °
Friendly adjustment, however, claims that it succeeds in obtaining
and therefore enjoys the benefits of creditor control, which is its
Creditor's Meetings Sales Hearings 21A Exams.
Sched. No. Total No. Total No. Total
Cred. Held Attending Held Attending Held Attending
52. 12 3 0 0 - 0 -
53. 40 1 (comp. 0 0 - 0 -
case)
54. 38 5 o o - 4 0
55. 15 3 0 0 - 0 -
56. 49 3 1 3 0 0 -
57. 6 2 0 0 - 0 -
58. 49 2 3 0 -0 -
59. 8 2 0 0 - 0
60. 31 5 2 0 -0 -
61. 37 2 0 2 I I 2
62. 35 2 2 2 0 0 -
63. 36 2 0 2 0 0 -
64. 21 3 2 0 - 0 -
65. 138 2 0 5 0 1 0
66. 18 4 0 2 0 1 0
67. 334 2 0 2 0 6 o
68. 73 3 0 3 0 I 0
69. 32 2 0 2 0 1 0
70. 111 2 0 2 0 I 0
71. 1 2 0 2 0 I 0
72. 41 2 0 4 0 1 0
73. 64 2 0 2 0 I 0
74.46 2 0 2 1 1 0
75. 47 2 0 0 - 0 -
'The recent Supreme Court promulgation, (Jan. 13, 193o) amending General
Order 39 which prohibits the soliciting of claims should be noted in this con-
nection:
"The local Bankruptcy Court, may, however, when a banking institution is
under local nile or practice always appoint a receiver in cases requiring the ser-
vices of a receiver, by local rule approved by a majority of the Circuit Judges
of thel Circuit, provided that notice may be given to the creditors of the avail-
ability of such institutions as trustees if elected, and may provide means to facili-
tate the creditors in filing and voting their claims in favor of such institution
as trustee."
In New York City, the referee to whom the case is assigned sends to all
creditors a prepared proof of claim with proxy clause authorizing the referee to
vote the claim of the creditor in favor of the Irving Trust Co. as trustee.
In the Yale New Jersey study, out of 1oo cases selected at random, in 91
cases, the trustee was appointed by the referee, in 3 he was elected by creditors,
and in 6, he was appointed by the referee at the suggestion of creditors.
'See report, IN THE MATrE OF AN INQUIRY, Erc., supra note 7, at 23, 128, 137.
Also, infra note 76.
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underlying philosophy." But claims of remarkable success achieved
on this score in friendly adjustment must be taken guardedly. The
phrase "creditor participation" as applied to friendly adjustment
would seem to imply many meetings, active attendance and much time
spent upon deliberating the methods of best liquidating the estate.
Evidence of success in this respect in some of the bureaus does not
seem to be forthcoming.' In other bureaus," more than often, how-
ever, it has been found that "creditor participation" proves to be noth-
ing more than a matter of the bureau liquidator keeping in telephone
touch with certain of the available creditors, or mailing notices ad-
vising of major moves in the settlement of the estate." These notices
'See supra note 3.
"Testimony of Mr. Sheckell of the New York Credit Men's Association.
Report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUiRY, ETc., supra note 7, at 220:
"...The business man has been charged with not taking an interest in Bank-
ruptcy proceedings. I want to state tihat in Friendly Adjustment of the same
type cases, the business man takes a very keen interest in 95 or 97% of the
cases handled by our offices under the Friendly Adjustment plan. Under this
plan we have a creditors' committee..."
The following results were computed from the government study of Friendly
Adjustment cases in Newark, N. J., where such information was available.
All data was offered to the government by the Bureau from its files.
Case No. No. of unsecured creditors Creditors at- No. of
listed in the debtor's state- tending each Meetings
ient of liabilities meeting
L 46 20 4
2. 19 i5 I
3. 28 20 3
4 5 5 2
5. 77 55 2
6. 23 18 1
7. 19 12 4
8. 14 6 1
9. 87 40 3
10. 20 10 I
II. 115 6o 4
12. 21 10 2
13. 24 10 I
14. 13 5 I
15. 10 4 I
16. 29 15 I
17. 54 35 2
18. 56 40 5
19. 17 7 I
Average results: 57.16% of the creditors attended; 2.1 meetings held per case.
'By Mr. Paul 0. Ritter as a result of his visits to several bureaus, as a mem-
-ber of the staff for the committee submitting the report.
'See report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETc., supra note 7, at 220, where
the co-operation of creditors obtained by the Irving Trust Co. and in friendly
;adjustment is termed "merely advisory and informal".
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indeed seem to be a forte of the friendly adjustment system.' But
identical notices are a mandatory requisite in'bankruptcy.'
Lack of creditor participation and interest is expected as a general
defect in the liquidation of any insolvent's estate. Business men do
not wish to waste any more time or money on an already unprofitable
investment. No insolvency participation is a profitable enterprise to
the business man who is engaged in present, pressing, money-making
ventures."6 Consequently, the assignment of claims and subsequent
refusal to participate any further in the proceedings, which is com-
plained of in bankruptcy, is largely duplicated in friendly adjust-
ment.n7
'Some of the lack of direct creditor interest exhibited in bankruptcy
might possibly be explained also by the fact that the bankruptcy sys-
tem provides the creditors with a receiver, trustee, and their attor-
neys, who are direct legal representatives of the creditor's interests.
To procure such representation in friendly adjustment, the creditor
"Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 43o.
' Section s8 of the Bankruptcy Act, provides for io days notice by mail to
creditors of all examinations, hearings upon application for confirmation of
compositions, meetings, sales hearings, dividend payments, trustee's final ac-
counts filings, compromises, dismissal of proceedings and 3o days' notice for
applications for discharges. These notices may also be published in newspapers,
that of the first creditors' meeting being so required.
"Adjustment bureau practice strictly insists that each creditor have an oppor-
tunity to be heard". Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for Friendly
Adjustment"I supra note 2, at 43o. The above noticesk would show the same to
be true in bankruptcy. Creditors being advised, however, does not mean
"creditor participation" exists.
It should be noted that the committee submitting the report, IN rHE MATr
OF AN INQUiRy, Erc., supra note 7, at 54 recommends the future omission of
many of these requisite notices as a means of speeding up the liquidation of
the estate.
"
6Testimony of Hon. Paul Jones, District Judge, No. Dist. Ohio, in the report,
IN THE MArTR oF kAN INQuIRY, Tc., supra note 7, at 142: "The lack of in-
terest of creditors and their failure generally to participate in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is to be expected, and I do not know of any way to stimulate their
interest".
Testimony of Hon. Albert H, Reeves, District Judge, W. D. Mo.: "I do not
believe that creditors can be incited to take greater interest than at present. The
reason is that the bankrupt is hoplessly insolvent when he resorts to Bank-
ruptcy". Ibid.
Testimony of Hon. J. Foster, Symes, District Judge, Dist. Colo.: "Creditors
will not,, and cannot, be made to show sufficient interest." Ibid.
'See supra note 72.
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would have to employ his own attorney and himself assume the pay-
ment of the fee from which the bankruptcy system relieves him.
Personal attendance by local creditors, if there be any, may probably
be explained by this circumstance, or else by the novelty of this dif-
ferent type of liquidation proceeding. In most cases, however, the
absentee creditors far outnumber local creditors." That the former
"This is taken cognizancd of in the report, IN THE MArTE OF AN INQUMY,
ETC., supra note 7, at o.
The following represents the number of local and absentee creditors in
IOO cases picked at random in the Yale New Jersey study:
"Locals" "Absentees" "Locals" "Absentees"
1. o 16 45. 13 15
2. 0 20 46. 0 9
3. 9 19 47. 9 42
4. 47 46 48. 0 2
5. I II 49. 8 A
6. 3 85 50. 0 28
7. ii 8 51. I II
8. II 41 52. 3 37
"9. 32 8 53. 0 24
1o. 6 14 54. 0 15
II. 3 17 55. 0 79
12. 9 15 56. 6 1IO
13. 7 102 57. 0 49
14 9 17 58. I 43
15. 9 69 59. 0 8
16. 3 12 6o. 37 104
17. 13 1 61. I0 38
I8. 3 2 62. 8 29
19. 3 97 63. 12 23
20. 0 15 64. 0 6
21. 2 I8 65. 4 32
22. 15 3 66. IO II
23. 0 29 67. 0 52
24. 3 75 68. 15 25
25. 17 7 69. o 148
26. I 47 70. 8 127
27. 3 19 71. 3 15
28. 17 3 72. 28 54
29. I 9 73- 8 25
30. 6 23 74 21 313
31. I 22 75. I 25
32. 2 39 76. 0 73
33. 7 9 77. 16 i6
34. 41 20 78. o Ill
35 13 37 79. 8 3
36. I 77 80. o 81
37. 6 49 81. 6 35
38. o 16 82. 0 23
39. 8 6 83. 0 II
40. 0 96 84. 1 63
41. 5 82 85. 5 41
42. I 37 86. 6 12
43- 10 ii 87. 0 12
44- 8 1 88. 4 is
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should come in from other cities to pass judgment upon details of the
administration is obviously not to be expected.' Thus, the necessity
of their leaving such details to others is the same in friendly adjust-
ment as in bankruptcy. Their "cooperation" would probably mean
much more time and money lost than would be returned to them as
a result of it. Since the great majority of the claims are comparative-
ly small, a dividend of $20.00 in friendly adjustment rather than one
of $io.oo in bankruptcy on an average $Ioo.oo claim would hardly
seem to be sufficient inducement. From the business man's point of
view, the details of the liquidation should be handled by others ap-
pointed for the purpose, whoever the liquidator be.
The suggestions of Mr. Billig in this regard would seem, therefore,
not to be of great importance. They are: (i) "Provide in the Act for
the official recognition by the bankruptcy court of the recommendations
made by a bona fide creditors' committee, especially with respect to
the appointment of the receiver. . ." (2) "The exercise of such powers
[broad powers to be given receivers and trustees], however, should
be conditioned on the approval in writing of the creditors' commit-
tee. . . "' But in England, where similar features are a part of the
Bankruptcy Act, they rarely play a role, having no importance or sig-
nificance in the vast majority of cases.'
"Locals" "Absentees" "Locals" "Absentees"
89. 0 47 95. 12 22
9o. 5 62 96. o 8
91. 0 43 97. 0 18
92. 0 38 98. 7 42
93. 0 174 99. 4 2
94- 0 15 100. 5 53
Average "locals" per case: 7.64. Average "absentees" per case: 39.27. Per-
centage "locals" to "absentees": 19.46%.
'Either the results in the Newark Bureau cases, supra note 71, show that the
Bureau there is accomplishing this remarkable feat, or else the cases themselves
are unusual in the numbr of local creditors they involve; or possibly closely
adjoining New York City should be regarded as "local" for purposes of creditor
location.
"Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2, at 319.
"See article appended to report, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY. ETc., supra
note 7, at 279, giving a detailed picture of the workings of the English Act.
For "small bankruptcies" there is a summary administration. "Orders for sm-
mary administration are made in 80% of the cases. (Italics the writer's). Thus in
the great bulk of cases there is single administration by official liquidating organ-
izations. There is no Committee of Inspection (creditors). Experience having
shown that creditors take little or no interest in these small bankruptcies, the
machinery for creditor control is made negligible. A non-official trustee can
be put in control only by a special resolution (,4 in amount, majority in number
of creditors present or represented at the meeting)."
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III. HIGH COST OF ADMINISTRATION AND Low RETURNS TO
CREDITORS-STATISTICS
The bankruptcy reports of the Attorney General have been invoked
to illustrate the low percentages realized by general creditors on their
unsecured, liabilities. For a representative year, the returns were
shown to be as low as IO.11% for involuntary cases and 6.48% for
voluntary cases' No attempt to dispute the generally accepted as-
sumption of meager dividend returns derived from bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is here contemplated. Nevertheless, the results based on the
Attorney General's figures should not be taken at their face value in
proving this assumption. The results reached are too low. This is so
because analysis discloses the basic figure "total liabilities" in the
Attorney General's reports is, firstly, exaggerated, and secondly, even
Ibid. 308: "The experience of the English points to the conclusion that it is
impossible to secure keen creditor interest in the average case. The trading class
in England are literate and informed as to the condition of estates in which
they are interested. Their committees of inspection are invested with broad
powers of control and supervision. Yet active creditor control is iwt achieved.
(Italics the writer's). The trustee administers as he sees fit, subject only to the
audit of his accounts by the Board of Trade."
But because there may be cases in which creditors might, for some reason or
other, decide to step in, it would seem of no harm to have such provisions.
Other acts containing similar provisions are:
England: 46 and 47 Vicr. c. 52 (1883) as amended by 16 and 17 GEo. V, c. 7,
§§20, 56-58, 79 (1927).
Canada: 9 and io Gto. V, c. 36 (igig) as amended by io and ii, GEo. V,
c. 34 (i92o) and ii and 12 GFO. V, c. 17, §§2, 21, 43 (1921).
Germany: Konkursordnung (COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD, Vol. 21)
§§84, 87-92, 129-234, 137, 149, 150, 159.
France has no such provisions in its Act.
The report itself is seemingly inconsistent with the article, however. At 27
and 28, recommendations are made for creditors' committees (inspectors),
written consents, etc., similar to those made by Mr. Billig, with the observation
that creditor participation would probably thus be secured in the same manner
in which it is secured it England, among others (Canada, Friendly Adjustment,
the Irving Trust Co. in New York). And at 221, "It seems reasonable to hope
that by simplifying and speeding up the administration along suggested lines,
by calling creditors together more promptly, and by giving creditors' commit-
tees a recognized status and official duties, the part of creditors in administra-
tion would become general instead of sporadic and isolated."
Of the 21 Newark cases closed in the Bureau by Friendly Adjustment, credi-
tors' committes were appointed in only 8, there being no such committees in
the ,other 13.
'Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 417, deducing from figures of the REP. ATTY. GEN. 1927 at 178.
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if corrected, a false one upon which to base a comparison of the divi-
dends resulting from the two systems.
Firstly, some of the many ways in which the figure is erroneous
and bloated are:
i. Cases in which a partner individually goes bankrupt, but
the remaining partners do not, the bankrupt partner, never-
theless, listing the partnership liabilities as his own. Part-
nership creditors, however, may derive satisfaction from
the other partners.
2. Cases in which husband and wife go through bankruptcy
proceedings separately, both listing themselves liable for
identical debts.
3. The similar situation in which bankrupt corporations list
the same debts for which the corporation officials also list
themselves liable in separate bankruptcy proceedings.
4. Cases in which the same bankrupt duplicates a debt, on dif-
ferent pages of the schedules, all to be included into the
bankrupt's final "total liabilities" figure. This occurs if the
bankrupt or his attorney, feels uncertain as to the exact
classification of a debt for the schedule sheet, and conse-
quently, lists the debt on two pages, i.e., listing the bank-
rupt's liability as endorser both on scheduleA3 (Debts to un-
secured creditors) and A 5 (Debts which other parties ought
to pay).
5. -Cases in which debts are listed which have already received
complete or partial satisfaction, or which will be fully or
partially satisfied by guarantors and sureties.
6. Cases in which false or mistaken liabilities are listed, i.e.,
debts which are in fact not enforceable obligations.'
These are but some of the more obvious ways in which the "total
liabilities" figure, representing the amount of debts annually thrown
into bankruptcy proceedings, is enlarged. It should be pointed out in
what manner some of these errors are included. The duplications
are obvious. As to the others, it is principally because the Attorney
General's figures "total liabilities" is based upon the schedules as
filed by the bankrupt. Included in the referee's final report of every
bankruptcy case referred to him is the item "scheduled liabilities
which have not been proved". These liabilities often make up a
large part of the figure "total liabilities" of the individual cases, from
which the Attorney General's final reports are derived, and it is this
inclusion of unproved debts which the bankrupt nevertheless sched-
ules-debts which may have never existed-which is the largest factor
in the errors. Hence the official bankruptcy figures in this respect
"'These typical duplications and errors glaringly appeared in an examination
of over i,ooo schedules filed in New Jersey.
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represent largely the bankrupt's own idea of his liabilities, fancied
or actual, true or mistaken. It seems clear that these are errors and
duplications which should be subtracted from the total amount of the
stated Attorney General's figure.
In respect to other items affecting the net figures, in 1924, a cor-
rected Attorney General's figure for the Southern District of New
York for administration expenses, "corrected", not in the light of the
above, but merely in eliminating office errors, showed a cost for this of
about 15% of the net amount realized.5 ' Figures quoted by Mr.
Billig from an Attorney General's report of the fiscal year 1926-
1927 and upon which he bases his comparison showed this ex-
pense to be about 24%, as compared with computed friendly
adjustment costs of about I4%." Likewise, the comparative re-
turns to creditors have been concluded to be about 6% for the
bankruptcy case, as against about 2732% for friendly adjust-
ment. These figures in each case should receive an adjustment
resulting from computations as to what is the true amount of "total
liabilities" thrown into bankruptcy in which case the disparities are
greatly reduced. Further, because it comes to the liquidator through
sources other than the bankrupt, the friendly adjustment case more
closely resembles involuntary bankruptcy which admittedly furnishes
higher returns than in the voluntary. It should also be borne in mind
that the erroneous duplications in bankruptcy liabilities are not
counteracted by similar erroneous duplications or inflations of sched-
uled assets. The alleged dividend percentages are based upon actual
"net assets realized", which figure is that of amounts actually derived
by sale of assets, or otherwise. It bears no relation to the bankrupt's
hopefully exaggerated idea of their value.
Secondly, for purposes of comparison especially, the Attorney
General's "total liabilities" figure is a misleading one. This is so
principally because of the inclusion of the no-asset case. These are
cases with which the bankruptcy machinery must deal. Friendly ad-
justment on the contrary handles only cases which will at least sup-
port a fee for the bureau that will be compensatory. This business
requirement would eliminate not only the strict no-asset case, but
"The figures were corrected at the request of the Merchants' Ass'n of New
York. See report, MERCHANTs' Ass'N OF NEW YORK, supra note io, at 13.
As a matter of fact, the figure "total liabilities" was increased, as was also,
howover, the dividend payments to creditors. They evidently had nothing to do
with the type of "corrections" referred to in the article.
"Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 436.
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also hundreds of small asset cases not able to furnish such a fee.
In other words, bankruptcy must accept any and all cases. Friendly
adjustment can pick its cases. It itself examines and investigates the
cases before it finally decides to accept.' Investigation discloses that
the number of cases which friendly adjustment would not touch and
with which the bankruptcy liability figure is burdened are many.
Liabilities represented by no-asset cases with which the bureau could
not bother and which for fair comparison would have to be deducted
from the Attorney General's total liabilities figure, is enormous' No
attempt is made'to gather even an approximate figure for the very
small asset case with which also the bureau would not deal.'* But this
type of case shows necessity of further adjustment before fair statis-
tical comparisons be attempted.
Moreover the published charts illustrating the high dividend returns
given to creditors in the "assignment" (liquidation, and therefore
comparable to bankruptcy) cases do not include those cases begun in
the Bureau as "extension" (continuation of the business) cases, and
subsequently liquidated because of unsuccessful results. Much has
been said of the splendid work done by the bureaus in thus saving
financially tottering concerns, instead of merely liquidating the re-
mains of the wreck.' Over-optimism about the results should again
T0lbid. 429, 430.
The following figures represent the appraised assets in the 25 Newark friendly
adjustment cases studied:
1. $534o.oo 14. 20280.00
2. 1220.00 15. 1583.50
3. not apraised-524.oo realized x6. not appraised-i47o.2o realized
4. 1220.00 17. not appraised-'I584.42 realized
5. 510.94 I8. 500.00
6. 81400 19. 400.00
7. 63400.00 20. 100.00
8. 1721.oo 21. no record of
9. 6oo.oo 22. 91635.00
10. 1850.00 23. 670o.oo
II. 1000.00 24. 1500.00
12. 1500.00 25. 300.00
13. 1200.00 Average=$8,623.o4
'In this country, nearly two-thirds of the cases are no-asset cases." Report,
IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., stupra note 7, at 35.
"'If we are to add to the no-asset cases those in which the assets are only
a hundred dollars or so, the proportion of cases in which no dividends, or nom-
inal dividends are paid, would be far higher than two-thirds." Ibid.
"The great majority of cases, placed as high as 75%, are comparatively small
bankruptcies". It Defense of the Nation's Receivables, supra note 5, at 9.
'Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Esbates, supra, note 2, at
300; Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment", supra
note 2, at 428; it Defense of the Nation's Receivables, supra note 5, at 9.
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be cautioned against. Recent research in the equity receivership, a
system designed to continue the business, inject new life, by reor-
ganization if necessary, in short, to save rather than liquidate, illus-
trates how lean have been such results. ' To make the figures fairer,
then, the outcomes of these unsuccessful "extension" cases should be
added to the liquidation tables. Inferentially from the results in equity
receivership there are many nonsuccesses. On the other hand cases
begun in equity receivership that subsequently found their way into
the bankruptcy court should also be deducted from the bankruptcy
figures.
As the whole matter of proof by statistical data is often dismissed
with the cynical "axiom" that "anything can be proved by statistics"
this interesting subject will be dismissed with the admission that re-
gardless of specific figures, Mr. Billig's excellent charts camparing the
results of liquidation by means of the two systems. of similar type
businesses seem, on the whole, to show returns in favor of friendly ad-
justment.
This adverse showing of the bankruptcy system is due primarily,
of course, to the general high cost of administration that this system
seems to require, and which consumes practically everything that is
realized from the estate. In general, this fact must be admitted.! It
"See Douglas and Weir, Equity Receiverships In The United States District
Court For Connecticut, 4 CoNN. B. J. i.
3 of the 25 Newark Friendly Adjustment cases have already gone to court.
8 more were extension cases that were still open.
"The following represents results of ioo asset cases picked at random in the
Yale New Jersey study.
Net Antwunt Cost of Realized Adin.
Realized Adin. Neh Amount Cost of
I. $ 464.46 $ 46446 20. 1586.28 1329.76
2. 6427.28 2271.33 21. 992.64 533.54
3. 737&82 2022.22 22. 5233.28 2939.10
4. 2630.00 736.99 23. 2103.42 2103.42
.5. 3957.09 2270.48 24. 1866.23 806.46
6. 262.0o 262.00 25. 4349.96 9 16
7. 121o6.89 4716.22 26. 12oo7.19 4595.12
8. 290.94 290.94 27. 1929.93 1110.78
9. 3903.85 2201.47 28. 1508.42 930.91
Io. 636287 3126.24 29. 2672.83 2207.63
IT. 135.22 135.22 30. 26703.20 2603.62
12. 258.61 258.61 31. 1253.50 653-50
13. 8678.95 4795.5, 32. 985.OO 636.95
14. 11708.02 4478.14 33. 2282.57 68i.o4
15. 2760.51 1862.31 34. 6oo.oo 505.43
i6. 3480.54 224478 35. 13297.35 3422.17
17. iiio2.98 31o2.98 36. 1694-.37 928.41
18. 116.o4 116.o4 37. 653.80 603.80
19. 415.90 415.90 38. 41.45 41.45
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has its effect particularly upon the small cases, in which the net
amount realized from the assets seldom exceeds the costs of adminis-
tration. But several matters must be kept in mind before we come to
a too condemnatory conclusion. Admitting that bankruptcy is more
expensive than friendly adjustment, as seems to be the general situa-
tion when any extra-legal settlement is compared with a court ma-
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increased costs than does friendly adjustment. This does not seem to
be the situation involved in other fields of extra-judicial settlements.
In the bankruptcy system creditors' rights are protected through-
out. The general problem of fraud has previously been discussed.
Creditors, or their legal representatives, are permitted to force the
examination not only of the debtor and his wife, but by Section 21A
of the Bankruptcy Act, of "any designated person". Such exami-
nations of course, are best conducted by experienced lawyers. They
are carried out with the force and effect of law, i.e., in court, under
oath, etc. Any other method would seem to be little short of worth-
less. That such examinations are often not productive of the desired
results should not minimize their importance. The system is so de-
signed that by an involuntary petition, and the use of the receiver,
the property may immediately be put in the charge of the court for
the benefit of all creditors. The preferential four month period for
the benefit of all creditors leads to involved law suits and legal ser-
vices, only because it is necessary to protect creditors. Frequently it
results in the creation of a substantial estate where at first little or
nothing appeared.
The system was also designed to be protective of the bankrupt's
rights. It grants him a discharge. It provides him an attorney's fee.
It allows him exemptions. A system guaranteeing such important
rights, privileges, powers and immunities is expensive. The friendly
adjustment system also claims the power to give a "contract" dis-
charge,' if the creditors conclude the bankrupt is worthy of one."
But here we meet the same difficulty which was encountered in the
original decision as to whether or not the bankrupt's "honesty" was
such as to warrant the bureau's retention of the case. What standard
shall be selected for determining whether the bankrupt is deserving of
the discharge? The mere whim of the creditors'-their possible desire
to let loose their anger against the insolvent himself, anger engendered,
possibly, by short-sightedness in having extended credit to such an in-
efficient (fraudulent) business man? The friendship adjustment
scheme has no yardstick.
The Bankruptcy Act, on the other hand, defines and sets up a
standard for which a refusal of a discharge may be made. Its legal
interpretation may be difficult, but it is necessary. The importance
of a legal discharge granted to the deserving-4.e., "honest" in the
"Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustment",
supra note 2, at 438.
"Ibid. 438, n. 6o.
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legal sense-insolvent debtor is not to be measured in dollars and
cents.' Purely from the bankrupt's point of view, it would seem that
a conscientious advisor should not recommend friendly adjustment
unless at least the three major rights of an attorney's fee, discharge,
and statutory exemptions were assured him. These matters have been
hitherto practically unmentioned in considering the problem, yet they
seem to have a direct relation to public policy.' It may be conceded that
a system that deprives bothcreditors and debtors of such privileges and
rights is bound to cost less.' But wise business men do not always
choose the cheaper article.
Again, it should be pointed out that generally speaking, the offi-
cials and their duties created by the Bankruptcy Act have their parallel
under the friendly adjustment plan. The receiver and trustee, the
chief liquidating officers in bankruptcy, have their counterpart in the
bureau liquidator; the receiver and trustee's attorney in the bureau's
attorney. Both systems employ appraisers, accountants, custodians
and auctioneers whenever needed. The fact that in broad aspects
each system structurally resembles the other indicates that practically
all of these offices, of duties, are essential to any systematic, orderly,
estate liquidation. They may be changed in small particulars, i.e.,
one appraiser may be substituted for the required three." But these
"See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law (1917) 66 U. OF PA.
L. 1R. 224. In the Yale New Jersey study, out of I,ooo cases studied, objections
to discharges were filed in 50. In only 5 of these, discharges were refused; in
33, the discharge was granted nevertheless, and 12 were still open.
'See report, IN THE MATTER OF AN IxQUIRY, Erc., supra note 7, at 177, quot-
ing from an address of Referee Geo. A. Marston of Detroit: "The debtor very
often does not receive any release from his obligations and after the distribution
is.. .forced into Bankruptcy in order to get a discharge..."
In the 25 friendly adjustment Newark cases studied, 4 went to the Bank-
ruptcy Court. Of the remaining 21, I debtor received his statutoryi exemptions.
In these same 21, releases were granted in 8, not granted in I, and "not yet"
in 12.
""The administration of bankrupt estates in England is as expensive as, if
not more than, the So. District of New York. The examination of the debtor's
conduct and affairs is far more careful and painstaking, and much of the ex-
pense is incurred on that score." Article appended to report, IN THE MATTER
OF AN INQUIRY, ETC., supra note 7, at 306.
"The examination of the debtor's conduct and affairs independent of the wishes
of the creditors and independent of the size of the estate is a most salutary
feature of the Act. It is undoubtedly expensive." Ibid. 308.
97Ibid. 58; Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra
note 2, at 320; Douglas and Weir, op. cit. supra note go, at 20.
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small differences do not make for basic superiority so far as costs
of administration regarding officers are concerned.
If in fact friendly adjustment seems to be able to do the work
cheaper, it is not essentially because it lessens the officers nor because
it has a simpler structure, but because the work required of these offi-
cers (which in a large number of cases seems to be absolutely neces-
sary) is reduced to a minimum and is not sovaluable. The one important
item of saving is that it does away with the intermediary court designed
to furnish protections and safe-guards to creditor and debtor alike.
These protections and safe-guards against dishonest debtors, against
dishonest and preferred creditors, of discharges, exemptions, exam-
inations,-may or may not be considered as "necessary", if they are,
they are factors in determining what is the "superior" system.
To those who claim, especially in the small bankruptcy case, that
the value of the article would appear to be too small to insure by the
"cumbersome" methods of bankruptcy, the reply should be that the
"dividend return" should not be measured in dollars and cents, but
rather in the fact that no cost is too high to have thorough protection
and investigation of the debtor, his wife, relatives, friends and other
creditors. The discussion on this point merely suggests the necessity
of some type of summary procedure in bankruptcy for small cases, '
similar to the English practice, the size of the estate only to be deter-
mined by further research, not necessarily that bankruptcy be dis-
carded entirely in favor of friendly adjustment.
Because of the large group of creditors, however, who are willing
to sacrifice the investigations and safe-guards of the bankruptcy ma-
chinery for the sake of salvaging as much as possible, from their in-
vestment (and it is not entirely strange that business men should be
so inclined) the wise suggestion has been made for another government
official, a paid examiner or investigator for all cases.' This is so be-
"See Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Iisolvent Estates, supra note 2,
at 316. Aso see supra note 81.
"It has seemed that in large estates there should be given to the creditors the
right to select their own trustee....The difficulty is to draw the line between
what are small and what are large estates, since the schedules based upon the
opinion of the bankrupt are liable to vary largely from the amounts actually
realizable." Report, Txz MERCHANTS' ASS'N. OF NEw YORK, supra note 10,
at 74.
"Ibid. 57-67, where a paid Auditor and Examiner is recommended, to be a
permanent official investigating all cases. It would be of particular importance
in the no-asset cases, where the estate can not afford to bear adequate investiga-
tions. At present, it is better for debtors to come in with no assets than with
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cause there are elements of policy in every case that transcend
mere considerations of dividend returns' x A salaried government
investigating official would present the two-fold advantage of per-
mitting larger dividend returns by not forcing the bankrupt estate to
bear this part of the costs of administration, and nevertheless of in-
suring a thorough investigation, especially in the cases listed as no-
asset and very small asset.
The distressing fact is that so many business men divorce them-
selves from these considerations. They do not insist upon strictly en-
forcing the discharge or criminal provisions of the Act,' 1 and expose
themselves and the entire business community to further exploitation
through fraud or inefficiency by unheedingly permitting bankrupts to
set themselves up in business again. This leads to the conclusion that
such duties in the interests of public policy, should fall upon
the Government itselfY2 The present Bankruptcy Act, deficient
in so many of these considerations, in thousands upon thousands of
cases, at least partially offers some such advantages and checks. But
friendly adjustment seemingly disregards the entire problem and
swings completely to the opposite extreme. Is one system "superior"
td the other? The difficulty of replying is obvious.
It should also be pointed out what can be done by way of low cost
of administration under the Bankruptcy Act. The bankruptcy figures
of Detroit show that expenses only very slightly higher than under
friendly adjustment can be obtained. This would seem to indicate
an estate that would support investigation, for the Bankrupt who comes in with
assets may thereby "hang" himself.
In England, it is the duty' of the Official Receivers to examine all cases.
Also, see report, IN THIA MATTER OF AN INQUIRY, ETC, supra note 7, at 43.
where a Federal Bankruptcy Commissioner is recommended, one of whose duties
would be the investigation of small asset cases.
10
"The aim [of the English Act] was not so much to give creditors the
largest possible returns in each individual case as to prevent occurrence of dis-
honest failures generally." Ibid. 36.
Also see memorandum, Ibid.
1
'See editorial, Bankruptcy Evils, New York Sun, Aug. 26, 1930.
1 2
"The central purpose of the English Act was to make bankruptcy a diffi-
cult and disagreeable process and so far as possible to weed out from the busi-
ness community corrupt and incompetent traders." IN THE MATTER OF AN IN-
QUrRY, ETc., supra note 7, at 36.
"We should have the principle followed in England. That principle is that
the enforcement of discipline is a public matter, that it cannot be left to the
initiative of scattered creditors, but must be effected through centralized govern-
ment machinery." Ibid. 37.
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that bankruptcy probably has come in for some unjust criticism as to
the costs of administration which are really necessary to keep the
wheels of the system moving in efficient fashion!'
CONCLUSION
It is practically impossible to judge any two systems that differ
so greatly in the number of cases handled. No fair comparison can be
made between the tens of thousands of cases that run through the
bankruptcy mill and the comparatively few selected cases turned out
by the bureaus. If the bureaus were subjected to the same barrage
of no-asset, small asset, and complicated-situation cases that bank-
ruptcy must administer, comparisons might more fairly be hazarded.
Any such statement as that credit men "now adjust a vast number
of merchant insolvencies" in their "own commercial forum,' there-
fore, when compared with the number turned out in bankruptcy, is
slightly misleading.'
On the whole, it is not denied that friendly adjustment seems
capable of furnishing larger dividends to creditors than does bank-
ruptcy. If this is the business man's sole consideration, then he
should choose this means of liquidation. But the inability of bank-
ruptcy to duplicate this particular feat should not be considered a
result of "flaws in the present system". Any system that simply
marshals the assets, sells them, and distributes the remains to credit-
ors, must necessarily be more generous in dividends. Query, why
cannot so-minded creditors informally appoint anyone to perform
these simple services and thus further increase their dividends by
"'Special local conditions, however, may account for these low Detroit figures:
Because of such local conditions, the Committee, (Ibid. 95) reported "...rela-
tive administration expense in different districts cannot be taken as a measure
of efficiency, because of variable factors (rents, etc.) which also include the size
of the cases involved". It-goes on to say, however, "complete receivership
administration, which is the rule in Detroit, does not necessarily involve added
expense to estates, but under proper direction, should mean reduced expense
through greatly reduced rentals".
10Billig, Extra-Jdicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, $upra note, 2,
at 317. (Italics are the writer's).
"In the fiscal year selected for comparisons in certain Districts, 1284 cases
were liquidated in friendly adjustment, and 17,927 were closed in Bankruptcy.
'More than zio,ooo Bankruptcy cases were concluded in the years, 1928,
1929." IN THE MATTER OF AN INQuiRY, ETc., supra note 7, at 35. The 25 New-
ark cases analyzed above represents the bulk of such work done there in the
past two years. There are 68 such bureaus.
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saving even the io% bureau fee? But these considerations are not
essentially an attack against the present system. It is merely claiming
that such a method is cheaper than any well designed bankruptcy
act can be. Thus, the statement that "the success of friendly adjust-
ment is partially dependent upon the existence of a National Bank-
ruptcy Act which has deficiencies""' is also misleading. It would
rather seem to be dependent upon the existence of any well-designed
bankruptcy act. In other words, no serious attempt is here made to
"defend" the present Bankruptcy Act. In certain of its phases it is
past defending.
But creditors should first realize the significance of their choice, i.e.,
what they are losing before they accept such a substitute system.
Speed and salvaging a few extra dollars from the wreck, the two
considerations in which friendly adjustment certainly excels, are only
two of many important considerations." Bankruptcy at least affords a
method of legal supervision, innumerable checks, prohibitions, and
protections. Friendly adjustment on the other hand liquidates with
a delightful informality.' It would be interesting to study the cases
that have been liquidated by the bureaus merely to ascertain the num-
ber of preferences that possibly lie hidden in them, and that could
have been set aside in bankruptcy; or how many of the pit-falls of
the "composition" are prevalent in its non-technical easy-going pro-
cedure. It is a fertile field for those who hitherto have had to make
their plans with due regard to the bankruptcy prohibitions.
There is not the slightest doubt, however, that there are many
cases that would lend themselves to the friendly adjustment type of
"lBillig, Extra-iidicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, supra note 2,
at 318, (Italics are the writer's).
'w"Bankruptcy administration [in England] is not cheap; nor is it speedy.
It is efficient in the realization of assets, in the investigation of the conduct and
affairs of the debtor, and in the exclusion from trade of persons whose activities
have been, shown to be a menace to honest and fair dealing in the commercial
life of the community." Article appended to report, IN THE MATTER OF AN
INQUIRY, ETC., sumpra note 7, at 308.
"'Referee George A. Marston of Detroit, in an address to the National Asso-
ciation of Referees in Bankruptcy, described the liquidation of insolvent estates
under a trust mortgage (which is used in some states instead of assignments)
as "the grand climax of looseness of administration. There is no control over
administration here whatever. The trustee disposes of the property for what-
ever price he thinks best; pays whatever expenses he wishes, and if there is any-
thing left, distributes it to creditors". Ibid. 177. "Our correspondence with
Judges, Referees and Attbrneys contain much criticism of the methods adopted
by... associations outside of bankruptcy." Ibid.- 176.
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settlement. Possibly some plan might be devised whereby, even under
the Bankruptcy Act, this form of liquidation could be employed, so
as to combine the advantages of both. But it should be realized that
bankruptcy as a system has been subjected to many false and exag-
gerated criticisms; that many of the grounds upon which it may with
justice be adversely criticised are equally applicable to the substituted
system advocated. The principal point is that the few simple details
accomplished in any kind of "friendly adjustment" admittedly can be
done more easily and therefore more cheaply than the more intricate
operations necessary to any well-designed Bankruptcy Act.
